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How much did fiscal policy contribute to euro area real GDP growth during the Great
Recession? We estimate that discretionary fiscal measures have increased annualized
quarterly real GDP growth during the crisis by up to 1.6 percentage points. We obtain
our result by using an extended version of the European Central Bank’s New Area-
Wide Model with a rich specification of the fiscal sector. A detailed modeling of the
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1 Introduction
The financial crisis triggered a large-scale fiscal policy response in the euro area, leading to
a sizeable increase in government deficits and debt levels. In the policy debate, it is often
argued that expansionary fiscal policies had a substantial impact on economic activity. So
a natural question that arises is how much did fiscal policy actually contribute to euro area
real GDP growth during the so-called Great Recession?
Most of the theoretical and empirical literature that analyses the impact of fiscal policy
on economic activity has focused on the size and sensitivity of fiscal multipliers or on
the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus packages.1 Prominent examples are the recent model-
based studies by Cogan et al. (2010), Christiano et al. (2011) and Coenen et al. (2012).2
However, the full fiscal policy response to the financial crisis did not rely on discretionary
fiscal stimulus alone. For instance, automatic stabilisers, as well as financial sector support
measures, did provide further support to the economy. Therefore, it is deemed essential to
account for the effects of automatic stabilisers when assessing the quantitative impact of
discretionary fiscal policies on real GDP during the crisis.
In this paper, and in contrast to previous model-based studies, we provide an ex-post
evaluation of the overall effectiveness of discretionary fiscal policies in the euro area during
the crisis on the basis of a growth accounting exercise. To this end, we utilise an extended
version of the ECB’s New Area-Wide Model (NAWM) with a detailed specification of the
fiscal sector to decompose the dynamics of real GDP growth in the euro area into the con-
tributions of fiscal and non-fiscal shocks over the period of 2007-10. Our specification of
the fiscal sector aims at balancing the need for a high degree of detail, which is deemed
important for conducting a meaningful quantitative analysis of the impact of fiscal policy
on real GDP, and tractability, which permits identifying the relevant economic mechanisms.
Specifically, the extended NAWM features: (i) non-Ricardian households, so that govern-
ment transfers have real effects; (ii) government consumption, which is valued by households
in a non-separable way; (iii) public capital subject to a time-to-build technology, which can
be either a complement or a substitute of private capital; (iv) time-varying distortionary
tax rates; and (v) fiscal rules, capturing the operation of automatic stabilisers.
Our model-based estimates suggest that discretionary fiscal policies led to an increase
in annualized quarterly real GDP growth by up to 1.6 percentage points during the crisis.
1Two such large-scale fiscal packages were the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) in the
United States and the European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP) in the European Union.
2See also Corsetti et al. (2011), Drautzburg and Uhlig (2011), Eggertsson (2011), Erceg and Linde´ (2010),
Uhlig (2010) and Woodford (2011). A review of the literature can be found in Coenen et al. (2012).
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The incorporation of as many as 8 time series that characterise fiscal policy and a detailed
modelling of the fiscal sector appear to be pivotal for our result. That is, a baseline version
of the model that only measures one fiscal time series, namely government consumption,
and that has a rather stylised fiscal sector, predicts a negligible role of fiscal policies for
real GDP growth during the crisis. We cross-check our central result by inspecting the
model’s multipliers and by conducting an assessment of the European Economic Recovery
Plan (EERP) similar to Cwik and Wieland (2010), European Commission (2009) and ECB
(2010).3 We show that our results are comparable to the findings in these studies, i.e. we
find that the effects of fiscal stimulus packages can be sizeable but are rather short lived.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview
of the model, while Section 3 reports on the data and the main estimation results. Sec-
tion 4 presents our central result regarding the contribution of discretionary fiscal policies
to euro area real GDP growth during the crisis. Section 5 presents the multipliers and the
assessment of the EERP, and Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
In this section we give a brief overview of the extended version of the ECB’s New Area-Wide
Model (NAWM) with a detailed specification of the fiscal sector. As the main elements of
the model’s baseline version are relatively standard, we just provide a non-technical sketch
of its basic structure and highlight subsequently those features that are most relevant for
understanding the enhanced role of fiscal policy in the extended model.
2.1 The Baseline Model: A Bird’s Eye View
The baseline version of the NAWM is a micro-founded open-economy model of the euro area
designed for use in the (Broad) Macroeconomic Projection Exercises regularly undertaken
by ECB/Eurosystem staff and for analysis of topical policy issues; see Coenen et al. (2008)
for a detailed description of the model’s structure. Its development has been guided by
the principal consideration of covering a comprehensive set of core projection variables,
including a small number of foreign variables, which, in the form of exogenous assumptions,
play an important role in the projections.
The NAWM features four types of economic agents: households, firms, a fiscal authority
and a monetary authority. Households make optimal choices regarding their purchases of
3See Cogan et al. (2010), Coenen et al. (2012) and Drautzburg and Uhlig (2011) for an analysis of the
ARRA package in the United States.
2
consumption and investment goods, the latter determining the economy-wide capital stock.
They supply differentiated labour services in monopolistically competitive markets, they
set wages as a mark-up over the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
leisure, and they trade in domestic and foreign bonds.
As regards firms, the NAWM distinguishes between domestic producers of tradable in-
termediate goods and domestic producers of three types of non-tradable final goods: a
private consumption good, a private investment good, and a public consumption good. The
intermediate-good firms use labour and capital services as inputs to produce differentiated
goods, which are sold in monopolistically competitive markets domestically and abroad.
Accordingly, they set different prices for domestic and foreign markets as a mark-up over
their marginal costs. The final-good firms combine domestic and foreign intermediate goods
in different proportions, acting as price takers in fully competitive markets. The foreign
intermediate goods are imported from producers abroad, who set their prices in euro in mo-
nopolistically competitive markets, allowing for an incomplete exchange-rate pass-through.
A foreign retail firm in turn combines the exported domestic intermediate goods, where
aggregate export demand depends on total foreign demand.
Both households and firms face nominal and real frictions, which have been identified
as important in generating empirically plausible dynamics. Real frictions are introduced
via external habit formation in consumption, through generalised adjustment costs in in-
vestment, imports and exports, and through fixed cost in intermediate goods production.
Nominal frictions arise from staggered price and wage-setting a` la Calvo (1983), along with
(partial) dynamic indexation of price and wage contracts. In addition, there exist financial
frictions in the form of domestic and external risk premia.
The fiscal authority purchases the public consumption good, issues domestic bonds, and
levies different types of distortionary taxes, albeit at constant rates. Nevertheless, Ricardian
equivalence holds because of the simplifying assumption that the fiscal authority’s budget is
balanced each period by means of lump-sum taxes. The monetary authority sets the short-
term nominal interest rate according to a Taylor (1993)-type interest-rate rule, stabilising
inflation in line with the ECB’s definition of price stability.
The NAWM is closed by a rest-of-the-world block, which is represented by a structural
VAR (SVAR) model determining five foreign variables: foreign demand, foreign prices, the
foreign interest rate, foreign competitors’ export prices and the price of oil. The SVAR
model does not feature spill-overs from the euro area, in line with the treatment of the
foreign variables as exogenous assumptions in the projections.
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2.2 The Model with an Enhanced Role for Fiscal Policy
In the extended version of the NAWM, we allow fiscal policy to influence the economy
through several additional channels. Specifically, the extended model features: (i) non-
Ricardian households, so that, inter alia, government transfers have real effects; (ii) gov-
ernment consumption, which is valued by households in a non-separable way; (iii) public
capital subject to a time-to-build technology, which can be a complement or a substitute of
private capital; (iv) time-varying distortionary tax rates; and (v) fiscal rules that determine
the endogenous adjustment of the different fiscal instruments.
2.2.1 Households and Government Consumption
We adapt the baseline model by introducing non-Ricardian households in the form of rule-of-
thumb consumers, following Gal´ı, Lo´pez-Salido and Valle´s (2007) and Coenen and Straub
(2005).4 To this end, we assume that there is a continuum of households, indexed by
h ∈ [ 0, 1 ], which is split into two groups: (i) Ricardian households, indexed by i ∈ (ω, 1 ],
who accumulate physical capital and have access to financial markets, and (ii) non-Ricardian
households, indexed by j ∈ [ 0, ω ], who do not. As a result, the former group of households
can smooth consumption intertemporally in response to shocks, whereas the latter simply
consume their after-tax disposable income.5
Furthermore, we adapt the model by allowing for non-separable valuable government
consumption similar to Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2009b). This feature has several in-
teresting implications. First, changes in government consumption affect optimal private
consumption decisions directly, as opposed to the indirect wealth effect in case of separable
government consumption. Second, conditional on the estimated degree of complementarity
a co-movement of private and government consumption may be obtained. Formally, ag-
gregate consumption C˜h,t of household h is defined as a constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) aggregate:
C˜h,t =
(
α
1
υG
G C
υG−1
υG
h,t + (1− αG)
1
υG G
υG−1
υG
t
) υG
υG−1
, (1)
where Ch,t denotes the household’s consumption of private goods, and Gt measures gov-
ernment consumption. Note that αG is a share parameter and υG > 0, where υG measures
4There is a large literature on rule-of-thumb consumers, with early contributions by Campbell and Mankiw
(1989) and Mankiw (2000).
5Coenen, McAdam and Straub (2008) consider a generalised framework in which non-Ricardian house-
holds can adjust their holdings of money subject to a transaction cost technology, which gives rise to limited
consumption smoothing on the part of non-Ricardian households.
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the elasticity of substitution between private consumption and government consumption.
υG → 0 implies perfect complementarity, υG →∞ gives perfect substitutability, and υG → 1
yields the Cobb-Douglas (CD) case.
Ricardian Households
Each Ricardian household i maximises its lifetime utility in a given period t by choosing
purchases of the private consumption good, Ci,t, purchases of a private investment good,
Ii,t, which determines next period’s private capital stock, Ki,t+1, and next period’s (net)
holdings of domestic government bonds and internationally traded foreign bonds, Bi,t+1
and B∗i,t+1, respectively. The household’s lifetime utility function is given by:
Et
[
∞∑
k=0
βk
(
ln
(
C˜i,t+k − κ C˜t+k−1
)
−
1
1 + ζ
(Ni,t+k)
1+ζ
)]
, (2)
where β denotes the discount factor and ζ is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour
supply. The parameter κ measures the degree of external habit formation in consumption.
Thus, the utility of household i depends positively on the difference between the current
household-specific aggregate consumption bundle, C˜i,t, and the lagged economy-wide ag-
gregate consumption bundle, C˜t−1, and negatively on labour supply, Ni,t.
The household faces the following period-by-period budget constraint:
(1 + τCt )PC,t Ci,t + PI,t Ii,t +
Bi,t+1
ǫRPt Rt
+
StB
∗
i,t+1[
1− ΓB∗(B
∗
t+1; ǫ
RP ∗
t )
]
R∗t
+ Ti,t (3)
= (1− τNt − τ
Wh
t )Wi,tNi,t +
[
(1− τKt )RK,t + τ
K
t δ PI,t
]
Ki,t + (1− τ
D
t )Di,t
+TRi,t +Bi,t + StB
∗
i,t + Ξ
B
i,t + Ξ
B∗
i,t ,
where PC,t and PI,t are the prices of a unit of the private consumption good Ci,t and
the investment good Ii,t, respectively. Wi,t denotes the wage rate for the labour services
provided to firms, Ni,t; RK,t indicates the rental rate for the capital services rented to firms,
Ki,t; and Di,t are the dividends paid by the household-owned firms. Rt and R
∗
t denote
the respective risk-less returns on domestic government bonds and internationally traded
foreign bonds. The latter are denominated in foreign currency and, thus, their domestic
value depends on the nominal exchange rate St.
The fiscal authority absorbs part of the household’s gross income to finance its expen-
diture. τCt denotes the consumption tax rate that is levied on the household’s consumption
purchases; and τNt , τ
K
t and τ
D
t are the tax rates levied on the different sources of the house-
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hold’s income: wage income, capital income and dividend income. Here, for simplicity, we
assume that the physical capital depreciation, δ PI,tKi,t, is exempted from taxation. τ
Wh
t is
the additional payroll tax rate levied on wage income (representing the household’s contri-
bution to social security). The terms Ti,t and TRi,t denote lump-sum taxes and lump-sum
transfers, respectively.
The effective return on the risk-less domestic bonds depends on a financial intermedia-
tion premium, represented by an exogenous domestic risk premium shock ǫRPt , which drives
a wedge between the interest rate controlled by the monetary authority and the return re-
quired by households. Similarly, when taking a position in the international bond market,
the household encounters an external financial intermediation premium ΓB∗(B
∗
t+1; ǫ
RP ∗
t ),
where ǫRP
∗
t represents an external risk premium shock. This specification implies that, in
the non-stochastic steady state, households have no incentive to hold foreign bonds and
the economy’s net foreign asset position is zero. The incurred intermediation premia are
rebated in the form of lump-sum payments, ΞBi,t and Ξ
B∗
i,t .
Finally, the physical capital stock owned by household i evolves according to the follow-
ing capital accumulation equation:
Ki,t+1 = (1− δ)Ki,t + ǫ
I
t (1− ΓI(Ii,t/Ii,t−1)) Ii,t, (4)
where δ denotes the depreciation rate of the private capital stock. ΓI(Ii,t/Ii,t−1) repre-
sents a generalised adjustment cost function in investment and ǫIt is an investment-specific
technology shock.
Non-Ricardian Households
The preferences of non-Ricardian and Ricardian households are identical. However, Non-
Ricardian households do not invest in physical capital and have no access to financial
markets. Therefore, each non-Ricardian household j sets nominal consumption expenditure
equal to after-tax disposable wage income plus government transfers. This results in the
following period-by-period budget constraint:
(1 + τCt )PC,t Cj,t = (1− τ
N
t − τ
Wh
t )Wj,tNj,t + TRj,t. (5)
Note that the approach to introducing non-Ricardian households adopted here implies
that lump-sum taxes are only paid by Ricardian households. Moreover, in response to
stochastic shocks, we allow for a possibly uneven distribution of transfers amongst Ricardian
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and non-Ricardian households according to the following rule: ̟ (TRi,t/TRi − 1) = (1 −
̟) (TRj,t/TRj − 1).
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Wage Setting and Labour Supply
As in Coenen and Straub (2005), we assume that both the Ricardian and the non-Ricardian
households supply their labour services to firms via unions which act as wage setters in
monopolistically competitive markets, taking firms’ aggregate demand for labour as given.
Furthermore, we assume that the individual union’s choice variable is a common nominal
wage rate for both types of households. These assumptions imply that the model’s aggregate
wage Phillips curve is unaffected by the introduction of non-Ricardian households.
Finally, we assume that the unions pool the wage income of all households and then
distribute the aggregate wage income in equal proportions.7 The common wage rate, Wi,t =
Wj,t = Wt, and identical separable preferences imply that Ricardian and non-Ricardian
households supply the same amount of labour, i.e. Ni,t = Nj,t = Nt.
8
2.2.2 Intermediate-Good Firms and Public Capital
Public capital is added as an input for domestic intermediate goods production. In partic-
ular, each intermediate-good firm f ∈ [ 0, 1 ] producing a differentiated intermediate good
Yf,t has access to a Cobb-Douglas technology which takes as inputs labour services Nf,t and
physical capital K˜f,t:
Yf,t = εt
(
K˜f,t
)α
(ztNf,t)
1−α
− zt ψ. (6)
The variable εt represents a serially correlated, but transitory technology shock that af-
fects total factor productivity, while the variable zt denotes a permanent technology shock
that introduces a unit root in the firm’s output by augmenting the productivity of labour
lastingly. The (gross) rate of labour-augmenting productivity gz,t = zt/zt−1 follows a seri-
ally correlated process and determines the model’s balanced growth path. The term zt ψ
represents the firm’s fixed costs of production.
Physical capital is a CES aggregate of private capital services Kf,t and the public capital
6In steady state, we compute TRi and TRj such that Cj/Ci = ι, where ι is an estimated parameter which
equals roughly 0.8 at the posterior mode.
7Formally, this can be justified by the existence of state-contingent securities that are traded amongst
unions in order to insure households against variations in household-specific wage income associated with
Calvo-type wage rigidities.
8The alternative assumption that non-Ricardian households set their wage rate equal to the average wage
rate of Ricardian households and face identical labour demand would yield the same result that wages and
labour supply are identical across both groups.
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stock KG,t:
K˜f,t =
(
α
1
υK
K (Kf,t)
υK−1
υK + (1− αK)
1
υK (KG,t)
υK−1
υK
) υK
υK−1
, (7)
where αK is a share parameter, and the parameter υK > 0 denotes the elasticity of substi-
tution between private capital services and the public capital stock. υK → 0 implies perfect
complements, υK → ∞ gives perfect substitutes, and υK → 1 yields the CD case. Note
that each intermediate-good firm f has access to the same public capital stock and that the
latter grows at the same speed as private capital services along the balanced growth path
of the model.
Recently, Leeper, Walker and Yang (2009b) have argued that time-to-build for public
capital is important for analysing the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA).
In fact, government investment is typically subject to longer implementation delays than,
for example, government goods purchases. In particular, it takes time until a budgeted
government investment project (e.g. infrastructure) is implemented and contributes to
the public capital stock. Leeper, Walker and Yang (2009b) model the delays between the
authorisation of a government spending plan and completion of an investment project by a
time-to-build technology for public capital projects, as in Kydland and Prescott (1982).9
We allow for the possibility of several periods of time-to-build in public capital, adopting
a similar specification. We thus assume that the government initiates investment projects
that take L periods until they become productive and augment the public capital stock.
The law of motion for public capital is then given by:
KG,t+1 = (1− δG)KG,t +AIG,t−L+1, (8)
where δG, denotes the depreciation rate of the public capital stock. AIG,t−L+1 is the autho-
rised budget for government investment in period t− L + 1. Government investment that
is actually implemented (outlayed) is defined by:
IG,t =
L−1∑
n=0
bnAIG,t−n (9)
with
∑L−1
n=0 bn = 1, and enters the government budget constraint as well as the economy’s
aggregate resource constraint.
9For an approach in which the government chooses government investment to maximise output net of
government investment, see e.g. Drautzburg and Uhlig (2011).
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In the case of a one-period time-to-build technology (as assumed for private investment),
public investment outlayed in period t becomes productive in period t+ 1, i.e. L = 1 and
IG,t = AIG,t.
2.2.3 Government Budget Constraint and Fiscal Rules
The fiscal authority purchases the public consumption good, Gt, and the public investment
good, IG,t, issues bonds to refinance its debt, Bt, makes transfer payments, TRt, and raises
different types of taxes with details on the latter given above. The fiscal authority’s period-
by-period budget constraint has the following form:10
PG,tGt + PIG,t IG,t +Bt + TRt (10)
= τCt PC,t Ct +
(
τNt + τ
Wh
t + τ
Wf
t
)
WtNt
+ τKt (RK,t − δ PI,t)Kt + τ
D
t Dt +
Bt+1
Rt
+ Tt,
where PG,t and PIG,t are the prices of a unit of the public consumption good and the public
investment good, respectively. τ
Wf
t denotes the rate of firms’ contributions to social security.
Note that all quantities are expressed in per-capita terms.11
The fiscal instruments on both the expenditure and revenue side are assumed to follow
the prescriptions of simple feedback rules with a uniform specification. Specifically, we
assume that all fiscal instruments react to their own lagged values, to real government
debt, Bt/Pt, and to output, Yt, where the latter feedback is thought to reflect the notion of
automatic stabilisers.
On the expenditure side, taking government consumption as an example, the log-linear
specification of the rule is given by:
gˆt = θG gˆt−1 + θG,B bˆt + θG,Y yˆt + (1− ψG) ηˆ
G
t + ψG ηˆ
G
t−1, (11)
where a ‘ˆ’ denotes log-deviations from the values implied by the model’s balanced growth
path, or steady state. ηGt is an unanticipated shock to government consumption, represent-
ing a discretionary fiscal impulse. Following Leeper, Walker and Yang (2009a) we allow for
10In deriving the budget constraint, we have used the fact that the total wage sum paid by firms to the
households equals
∫ 1
0
Wh,tNh,t dh = Nt
∫ 1
0
Wh,t (Wh,t/Wt)
−ϕW /(ϕW−1) dh = WtNt, where ϕ
W denotes
the steady-state wage markup in the model.
11The aggregate quantity of a household-specific variable Xh,t, expressed in per-capita terms, is given by
Xt =
∫ 1
0
Xh,t dh = (1− ω)Xi,t + ωXj,t.
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pre-announcement effects, with a weight of ψG. In terms of fiscal feedback rules, we allow
for the same structure for government investment and government transfers.
Similarly, as an illustration of the fiscal rules on the revenue side, the labour tax rule is
given by:
τ˘Nt = θN τ˘
N
t−1 + θN,B bˆt + θN,Y yˆt + (1− ψN ) ηˆ
N
t + ψN ηˆ
N
t−1, (12)
where a ‘˘’ denotes percentage-point deviations from the steady-state tax rate. In terms
of rules, we allow for the same structure for employer and employee social security contri-
butions as well as for lump-sum taxes. Note that for consumption taxes, we only allow for
pre-announcement but not for feedback on debt or output. All other fiscal instruments are
kept constant at their steady-state values.
3 Bayesian Estimation
We adopt the approach outlined in An and Schorfheide (2007) and Schorfheide (2000) and
estimate the extended version of the NAWM employing Bayesian inference methods over
the sample period from 1985Q1 to 2010Q2 (using the period 1980Q2 to 1984Q4 as training
sample). This involves obtaining the posterior distribution of the model’s parameters based
on its log-linear state-space representation using the Kalman filter.12
An extensive discussion of the estimation results for the extended NAWM is beyond the
scope of this paper. Here we report selectively on the data used in the estimation, on the
model’s shock processes, on the calibration of important steady-state ratios and on the prior
and posterior distributions of key parameters, to the extent that this helps to understand
the enhanced role of fiscal policy in our model. For details concerning the estimation of the
baseline model structure the reader is referred to Christoffel et al. (2008, Section 3).
12Although we employ linear methods to solve and estimate the model, recent data for euro area nominal
interest rates may be subject to a potentially important non-linearity—the zero lower bound (ZLB). In
order to check the importance of the ZLB we pursue the following analysis. From the data set used in
the model estimation we select the following three quarterly time series: consumer price inflation, log real
GDP and the 3-month Euribor interest rate. We use these data to simulate the nominal interest rate that
is implied by the Taylor-type feedback rule (see Coenen et al., 2008) in the model. The feedback rule has
the following arguments: previous quarter nominal interest rate (interest rate smoothing), deviations of
previous quarter inflation rate from inflation rate target, deviations of log real GDP from trend and quarter-
on-quarter changes of the inflation rate and log real GDP. Using the feedback coefficients at the estimated
posterior mode, it turns out that the actual nominal interest rate and the simulated one are very close. More
importantly, the simulated nominal interest rate in the years 2009-10 is positive albeit not very far from
zero. A high degree of interest rate smoothing is important for this result. That is, with no interest rate
smoothing the simulated nominal interest rate would be negative indeed. However, for moderate degrees of
interest rate smoothing, the ZLB does not appear to be of pivotal importance in our sample of interest so
that we shall proceed with the analysis.
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3.1 Data and Shock Processes
In estimating the extended version of the NAWM, we use quarterly time series for 17
out of the 18 macroeconomic variables used in the estimation of the baseline model: real
GDP, private consumption, government consumption, extra-euro area exports and imports,
the GDP deflator, the consumption deflator, the extra-euro area import deflator, total
employment, nominal wages per head, the short-term nominal interest rate, the nominal
effective exchange rate, foreign demand, foreign prices, the foreign interest rate, competitors’
export prices, and the price of oil. The time series for total investment is replaced by the
time series for private investment. All time series are taken from an updated version of
the AWM database (see Fagan, Henry and Mestre, 2001), except for the extra-euro area
trade data, the construction of which is detailed in Dieppe and Warmedinger (2007), and
the government consumption data. For further details on the data and their transformation
prior to estimation see Christoffel et al. (2008, Section 3.2).
For government consumption and 7 additional fiscal variables, namely government in-
vestment, government transfers, indirect taxes, direct taxes, employees’ and employers’
social security contributions, as well as government debt, we use quarterly time series from
a new fiscal database by Paredes et al. (2009). This database exploits intra-annual fiscal
information for interpolation purposes which allows to capture genuine intra-annual “fiscal”
dynamics in the data. This helps to circumvent two important problems that are present
in fiscal time series interpolated on the basis of general macroeconomic indicators: (i) the
endogenous bias that arises if such interpolated fiscal series were used with macroeconomic
variables to assess the impact of fiscal policies; and (ii) the well-known decoupling of tax
collection from the evolution of macroeconomic tax bases (revenue windfalls/shortfalls). For
further details on the fiscal data see the Appendix.
Data on government consumption are available in real terms, while existing nominal
data on government investment and on government transfers and government debt are
deflated using, respectively, the private investment deflator and the private consumption
deflator from the AWM database. Revenue data are constructed as a ratio to consumption
expenditure (indirect taxes) or to wage and salary income (direct taxes as well as social
security contributions). We remove a linear trend from all fiscal data, except for social
security contributions and government debt from which we subtract HP-trends and a broken
linear trend, respectively.13 Figure 1 shows the time series of the transformed fiscal variables
13Compared to the earlier sample, government debt grew at a much slower rate after the year 1993, i.e.
after the Maastricht treaty became effective. Since political economy considerations are beyond the scope
of the model, we choose a breakpoint for the linear trend of government debt in 1993Q4. Further, due to
11
for our sample period from 1985Q1 to 2010Q2.
Commensurate with the number of time series used in the estimation, the extended
NAWM features 20 distinct structural shocks, several of which have been discussed in Sec-
tion 2, plus the 5 shocks in the SVAR model for the foreign variables. In particular, we
distinguish 7 shocks entering the fiscal feedback rules for government consumption, invest-
ment and transfers, for indirect and direct taxes, and for employees’ and employers’ social
security contributions, plus a shock to the lump-sum tax rule which closes the government
budget constraint in the model. All shocks are assumed to follow first-order autoregressive
processes, except for the shocks to the interest-rate and fiscal feedback rules and the shocks
in the SVAR model, which are assumed to be serially uncorrelated.14
3.2 Calibration and Prior Selection
Regarding the NAWM’s steady state, all real variables are assumed to evolve along a
balanced-growth path with a steady-state growth rate of 2% per annum, which roughly
matches average real GDP growth in our estimation sample. Consistent with the balanced-
growth assumption, we then calibrate key steady-state ratios of the model by matching
their empirical counterparts over the sample period. For example, the expenditure shares
of private consumption, private investment, government consumption and government in-
vestment are set to, respectively, 57.5%, 18.3%, 21.5% and 2.8% of nominal GDP, while the
export and import shares are set to 16%, ensuring balanced trade in steady state; see Ta-
ble 1. Conditional on the model’s steady-state growth rate, the discount factor β is chosen
to imply an annualised equilibrium real interest rate of 2.5%, while, on the nominal side,
the steady-state inflation rate is set equal to 1.9% per annum, consistent with the ECB’s
quantitative definition of price stability.
On the demand side of our model, we set the share of private consumption in the
aggregate consumption bundle, αG, equal to 0.75. At the prior and posterior modes, this
parameter value implies roughly equal marginal utilities of private (Ricardian) consumption
and government consumption. Turning to the model’s supply side, we set the capital share
institutional reforms in e.g. Italy data on social security contributions (SSC) show a quantitatively large
increase in the mid-1990s for several years before reverting back. A simple linear trend would imply negative
deviations of detrended SSC before and after the mid-1990s throughout. As a step forward, we remove
HP-trends from these data.
14In addition, see Christoffel et al. (2008), we account for measurement error in extra-euro area trade
data as they are prone to sizeable revisions. We also allow for small errors in the measurement of real GDP
and the GDP deflator to alleviate discrepancies between the national accounts framework underlying the
construction of official GDP data and the models’s aggregate resource constraint. All measurement errors
are assumed to be serially uncorrelated.
12
of output, α, to 30% and the depreciation rate of both private capital, δ, and public capital,
δG, to 6% at an annualised rate. Furthermore, we assume b0 = 1 with one period time-
to-build for public capital and set αK = 0.9. The latter parameter value implies that the
marginal products of private and public capital are roughly equal at the prior and posterior
modes. As concerns capital formation, we fix τK = 0.35 in line with Trabandt and Uhlig
(2011). Finally, similar to e.g. Drautzburg and Uhlig (2011), we allow for a wedge between
the return on capital and government bonds. We assume this wedge to be constant over
time and set it to roughly 0.8 percentage points per annum in steady state.15
As regards the fiscal sector, the steady-state tax rates are calibrated so that average tax
rates match the corresponding average revenue-to-output ratios in the data. This approach
is consistent with our treatment of distortionary taxes as latent variables by measuring tax
revenues in the data. Specifically, we set the steady-state values of the indirect and direct tax
rates, τC and τN , to 22.3% and 11.6%, respectively. Similarly, employees’ and employers’
social security contributions, τWh and τWf , are set to 12.7% and 13.2%, respectively. We set
the tax rate τD to zero throughout. Regarding government debt, we assume a steady state
debt-to-GDP ratio of 60% per annum consistent with the Stability and Growth Pact, which
provides an anchor for debt developments in the euro area over the medium to long term.
This value is close to the average share of government debt to GDP of approximately 65%
at the onset of the crisis, but significantly below the levels of debt reached in the aftermath
of the crisis.
Finally, we calibrate a small number of additional parameters that are inherently difficult
to identify. This concerns, for example, the inverse of the labour supply elasticity ζ, which
we set equal to 2 in line with the range of available estimates in the literature, and the
parameter ψ determining the fixed costs of production of intermediate-good firms, which
we calibrate such that firms’ profits are zero in steady state.
We select our model priors endogenously, using a strategy similar to Christiano, Tra-
bandt and Walentin (2011). Concerning the choice of the initial prior distributions, we use
broadly the same priors as Christoffel et al. (2008) for those parameters that are common
to the baseline and the extended version of the NAWM. So our discussion here focuses on
the prior distributions of the parameters characterising the fiscal sector in the extended
model, as detailed in Table 2. To start with, for the share of non-Ricardian households ω
we choose a beta distribution with a mean of 0.5 and a standard deviation of 0.1. Similarly,
for the distribution parameter ̟ we assume a beta distribution with mean 0.5 and standard
15We have also experimented with allowing for time variation in this wedge. However, none of our funda-
mental results changed substantially.
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deviation 0.2. Noting that the elasticities υG and υK of the CES aggregates determining
aggregate consumption and the aggregate capital stock are restricted to be positive by the-
ory, we specify a truncated normal distribution with mean 1 (corresponding to the CD case)
and standard deviation 0.1 for these parameters.
Turning to the feedback coefficients on output and debt in the fiscal rules, θ·,Y and
θ·,B, we adopt normal distributions with mean 0 and standard deviation 2. For the coeffi-
cient on the own lagged value of the fiscal instrument, θ·, we use a beta distribution with
mean 0.5 and standard deviation 0.2, and for the weights concerning the importance of
pre-announcement effects, ψ·, we employ a beta distribution with mean 0.5 and standard
deviation 0.2. Finally, for the standard deviations of the fiscal shocks we use inverse gamma
distributions with mode 0.10 and 2 degrees of freedom, reflecting the fact that there is little
a priori information on these parameters.
3.3 Posterior Distributions
In Table 2, we present estimation results for selected parameters characterising the fiscal
sector in the extended version of the NAWM. The entries in the posterior-mode column refer
to the values of the structural parameters that are obtained by maximising the model’s
posterior distribution. The remaining three columns report the mean as well as the 5%
and 95% percentiles of the (marginal) posterior distributions which are computed using a
posterior sampling algorithm.
The posterior mode of the share of non-Ricardian households equals ω = 0.18 which
is similar, if anything somewhat smaller, compared to e.g. Coenen and Straub. Based on
the findings in the literature (see e.g. Coenen and Straub, 2005, and Gal´ı et al., 2007), the
estimated share would, in general, be too low for generating a positive output multiplier
of government consumption shocks in a standard New-Keynesian DSGE model. Yet in our
model it will nevertheless allow transfer shocks to play a material role via distributional
effects. The strength of these effects is determined by the distribution parameter with a
posterior mode estimate of ̟ = 0.30. The posterior mode estimate of the elasticity of
substitution between public and private consumption goods is υG = 0.29, so that the two
goods enter the households’ utility function as rather strong complements. Similarly, the
posterior mode estimate of the elasticity of substitution between private and public capital
is υK = 0.84, giving rise to moderate complementarities in the composite capital stock.
Turning to the parameters of the fiscal rules, the feedback coefficients in both the expen-
diture and tax rules seem in general well-identified by the data. For government investment
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and transfers, we estimate relatively sizeable feedback coefficients on government debt with
θIG,B = −0.18 and θTR,B = −0.14, while the reaction of government consumption to debt is
estimated to be weaker with θG,B = −0.02. With the exception of government investment,
the expenditure items are estimated to react less strongly to movements in output, but
positively: the posterior mode estimates are θIG,Y = 0.55, θG,Y = 0.06, and θTR,Y = 0.10,
respectively. On the revenue side, the feedback of lump-sum taxes to government debt
and output is estimated at θT,B = 0.07 and θT,Y = 0.21, respectively. Smaller feedback
coefficients are obtained for labour income taxes plus employees’ social security contribu-
tions (θWh,B = −0.01 and θWh,Y = −0.05) and for employers’ social security contributions
(θWf ,B = 0.01 and θWf ,Y = −0.03). Overall, these results indicate that feedbacks from
government debt and output to expenditure items are stronger than to revenue items.
Pre-announcement effects seem to play a role, in particular for government investment
(ψIG = 0.93), transfers (ψTR = 0.81), and lump-sum taxes (ψT = 0.90).
In Table 3, we compare the posterior mode estimates of selected parameters that are
common to the extended and the baseline version of the NAWM. Overall, the posterior
mode estimates of the parameters characterising households’ preferences, wage and price-
setting behaviour, final-good production, adjustment costs and monetary policy are found
to be broadly similar across the two model versions. That is, the estimation of the common
parameters appears rather robust to the extension of the NAWM’s fiscal sector and to the
inclusion of the additional 7 fiscal variables in the set of observables.
4 Discretionary Fiscal Policies during the Crisis
4.1 Comparing Historical Decompositions
In order to assess the predictions of our enhanced version of the NAWM for the role of dis-
cretionary fiscal policies during the crisis, we compare the implied historical decomposition
of euro area real GDP growth over the period 2007-10 with the decomposition implied by
the baseline NAWM with a stylised specification of the fiscal sector and with government
consumption being the only observed fiscal variable. As the baseline model assumes a bal-
anced budget, there is no role for fiscal rules in determining macroeconomic outcomes and
all distortionary tax rates are constant.
We first consider the historical decomposition obtained with the baseline model. To
this end, we decompose annualised quarter-on-quarter real GDP growth (in deviation from
the mean GDP growth rate) into the contributions of fiscal and non-fiscal shocks. With
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government consumption being the only observed fiscal variable, the baseline model features
a single fiscal shock associated with discretionary government spending. The historical
decomposition depicted in Figure 2 suggests that discretionary fiscal spending played a
negligible role in stabilising real GDP growth in the years 2009-10. This could lead to the
conclusion that in a counterfactual world without discretionary fiscal policy measures, real
GDP outcomes would have not been significantly different from the ones observed.
In contrast, in our model with an enhanced fiscal sector and using as many as 8 dif-
ferent fiscal variables as observables, the role of discretionary fiscal policies is much more
prominent. The decomposition of real GDP growth in Figure 3 suggests that discretionary
fiscal shocks pushed up annualised quarter-on-quarter growth rates by up to 1.6 percentage
points (in 2009Q2). Naturally, the question arises which fiscal shocks had the strongest
positive impact on euro area real GDP growth during the crisis. To shed some light on that
question, we present the contributions of the individual fiscal shocks in Figure 4. According
to the figure, shocks to government investment, government consumption, transfers, as well
as consumption and labour income taxes have all been important in supporting euro area
GDP growth.16 As we demonstrate later, these findings on the relative importance of the
fiscal shocks are broadly in line with the fiscal measures that were actually enacted under
the EERP.
4.2 Inspecting the Economic Mechanisms
What drives the important role of fiscal variables in our enhanced model? We aim to
answer this question by highlighting the role of three particular features of our model (i)
the inclusion of non-Ricardian households, (ii) non-separable government consumption, and
(iii) public capital. Note that for the sake of simplifying the analysis, we exclude all feedback
and pre-announcement effects from the fiscal rules. We only allow lump-sum taxes to react
to government debt.
In Figure 5, we show the impact of transfer shocks on private consumption under three
different parameterisations. For ω = 0, all households in our model are Ricardians and,
thus, there are also no distributional effects. Accordingly, transfer shocks have no impact
on consumption. We would consider this as the benchmark parameterisation, as most DSGE
models assume neither a role for non-Ricardian households nor for income redistribution.17
16The slightly negative contribution of government investment in 2009Q1 is consistent with a sharp fall
in public construction activity because of the adverse weather conditions around the turn of the year.
17If the feedback effects in the fiscal rules were active, the impact on private consumption would be
negative since any increase in transfers needs to be partly financed by an increase in distortionary taxes.
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In contrast, when ω = 0.35, we observe a rather strong impact of transfer shocks on private
consumption as the non-Ricardian households consume the additional income induced by
the rise in transfers. Note that this impact is not only driven by the hand-to-mouth con-
sumption behaviour of the non-Ricardian households, but also by the implied re-distribution
of income from Ricardian to non-Ricardain households. As an intermediate case, we con-
sider the estimated share of non-Ricardian households with ω = 0.18. Not surprisingly,
under this parametrisation the reaction of private consumption is less pronounced.
Another feature that is crucial for understanding the transmission of fiscal shocks in our
model, is the assumption that government consumption is valued and non-separable. Start-
ing with the benchmark case of modelling government consumption as pure waste, i.e. with
αG = 1, Figure 6 depicts a persistent negative response of private consumption to an ex-
ogenous increase in government spending. The “crowding-out” of private consumption is
caused by the negative wealth effect implied by an increase in government debt and the an-
ticipation of a higher tax burden in the future. Our estimated share of non-Ricardians is not
large enough to overturn this effect. This result holds under more general parameterisations,
as discussed in Coenen and Straub (2005). Assuming that public and private consumption
are highly substitutable, e.g. with υG = 3, induces a strong negative reaction of private
consumption to a government consumption shock. However our posterior mode estimate
of υG = 0.29 suggests that the data favour a specification with a strong complementarity
of public and private consumption. In this case, we observe a positive and hump-shaped
response of private consumption to an exogenous increase in public consumption.
Finally, in Figure 7, we evaluate the impact of a government investment shock on private
investment by varying the degree of substitutability of private and public capital. We choose
as the benchmark the Cobb-Douglas case with υK = 1. In this case, the reaction of private
investment to a government investment shock is as expected substantially negative. When
setting υK = 0.25, the decline in private investment following a government investment
shock is muted as private and public capital are strong complements. Using our posterior
mode estimate of υK = 0.84 for simulating the response of private investment represents
an intermediate case. Naturally, the question arises under which parameterisation does a
government investment shock crowd in private investment? It turns out, that we would
need to set υK = 0.25 and αK = 0.85 to trigger a positive reaction of private investment
after a government investment shock. Thus, a relatively strong complementarity together
with a larger share of public capital in composite capital leads to “crowding-in”.
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5 Fiscal Multipliers and the Impact of the EERP
Governments in the euro area have responded to the economic crisis with a range of fiscal
stimulus measures within the framework of the EERP. Table 4 provides a breakdown of the
different fiscal measures implemented at the euro area level, as estimated by the European
Commission (2009). In total, the fiscal stimulus measures amount to 1.1% and 0.8% of GDP
in the years 2009 and 2010, respectively. These fiscal measures have been implemented in
addition to the stimulus provided through the operation of automatic fiscal stabilisers and
do not include other extra budgetary actions such as capital injections, loans and guarantees
to the financial sector, as well as investment by public corporations.
Table 4 reveals that under the EERP support for households’ purchasing power ac-
counts for about 40% of the total stimulus in the euro area countries in 2009-10. These
fiscal measures have taken the form of a reduction in VAT, direct taxes, social security
contributions, as well as direct aid, such as income support for households and support for
housing or property markets. Notable stimulus measures have also been adopted to sup-
port investment and businesses directly. These categories account for roughly 30% and 20%
of the total stimulus, respectively. Support for investment has primarily taken the form
of public (infrastructure) investment, while the measures directly targeted at supporting
business activity have mainly been targeted at reducing business costs (reduction of taxes
and social security contributions, direct aid in the form of earlier payment of VAT returns,
subsidies and the stepping up of export promotion). Labour-market measures (wage sub-
sidies and active labour-market policies) account for about 10% of the total stimulus and
thus represent the smallest fraction of the total stimulus measures.
We use our model to illustrate, by means of simulations, the likely economic effects of the
EERP and compare them with the standardised fiscal multipliers of the estimated model. To
this end, Table 4 also provides information on how the different fiscal measures implemented
under the EERP were allocated to the model’s fiscal variables in the simulation exercise.
Because of the unavoidably imperfect match between the exact fiscal stimulus measures
adopted by the euro area member states and the model’s fiscal variables, a certain amount
of judgement is needed. For instance, labour-market measures are allocated to government
consumption since they represent primarily active labour-market policies, the costs of which
are paid for by the government. Nevertheless, keeping the above-mentioned caveat in mind,
the simulations broadly reflect the actual EERP measures.
In order to put the economic effects of the EERP into perspective, we first examine
the size of the fiscal multipliers implied by our estimated model. To this end, we simulate
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the effects of anticipated shocks to individual fiscal instruments that are assumed to last
for 2 years and that are calibrated so as to shift the fiscal instrument by 1% of GDP. The
stimulus is fully debt-financed in the first two years, with all fiscal rules being switched
off. Thereafter, lump-sum taxes adjust to balance the budget. Within the first two years,
the nominal interest rate is kept constant. Thereafter, the nominal interest rate adjusts
according to a static Taylor-type rule, which for the sake of comparability with other studies
(see Cogan et al., 2010, and Cwik and Wieland, 2010) reacts only to contemporaneous
inflation and real GDP growth, with response coefficients of 1.5 and 0.125, respectively.
The results in the upper panel of Table 5 show that the fiscal instrument with the
largest multiplier is government consumption. The impact multiplier equals 1.26, while
the long-run present-value multiplier is 1.63.18 The long-run multiplier is also above one
for exogenous increases in government investment. These results are of course driven by
the estimated degrees of complementarity between private and government consumption
as well as private and public capital. At the same time, transfers have rather modest
effects on GDP, despite the presence of non-Ricardian households and their distributional
impact in our model. Concerning the fiscal instruments on the revenue side, consumption
tax reductions have the largest multiplier, with 0.36 on impact and 0.48 in the long run.
Overall, the estimated multipliers on the revenue side are found to be low when compared
to the expenditure multipliers. Not surprisingly, a reduction in labour income taxes and in
social security contributions (SSC) of employees have a very similar impact on real GDP,
as they affect the same margin in the model.
The lower panel in Table 5 reports the simulation results for the EERP on the basis
of the information provided in Table 4. Note that we first re-calibrated the EERP shock
such that it is comparable to the model’s standardised multipliers, i.e. also representing a
two-year fiscal stimulus of one percent. In addition to the multipliers, we also include below
the GDP effects of the EERP. The multiplier in the first two years is positive, amounting to
about 0.68 and 0.72, respectively. Assuming that the fiscal stimulus measures are lifted in
the third year, the effects on real GDP fade away however rather quickly, as can be clearly
seen from the corresponding output effects, converging finally to a long-run multiplier of
around 0.89. These results are comparable to those from other studies such as Cwik and
Wieland (2010), European Commission (2009) and ECB (2010).
18We compute the present-value multiplier following Uhlig (2010).
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6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have conducted a quantitative evaluation of the effects of discretionary
fiscal policies on euro area economic activity during the Great Recession. To this end,
we have employed a DSGE model that is characterised by a rich specification of the fiscal
sector. We have estimated the model using Bayesian methods and utilising a large set of
euro area fiscal time series. Our results suggest that discretionary fiscal policies led to an
increase in annualized quarterly real GDP growth of up to 1.6 percentage points during the
crisis. We have argued that a detailed modelling of the fiscal sector and the incorporation of
many time series that characterise fiscal policy turn out to be pivotal for our result. Finally,
we have shown that discretionary fiscal spending, associated with the EERP, can generate
sizeable, albeit short-lived fiscal multipliers.
While our analysis has focused on the quantitative evaluation of the expansionary effects
of discretionary fiscal measures during the crisis, the latter has ledpartly as a consequence
of the enacted measuresto a sizeable increase in government deficits and debt levels. Hence,
future research ought to be extended towards examining the effects of fiscal consolidation
strategies aimed at curtailing deficits and debt levels over the medium term. In pursuing
this research, accounting for the endogenous nature of government bond premia, which have
been rising sharply in some countries, will be a fundamental challenge.
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Appendix: The Fiscal Data
In the estimation of our model, we use quarterly euro area data on general government
expenditures and revenues as well as general government debt from the new fiscal database
by Paredes et al. (2009):
• real general government final consumption expenditure (GCR)
• nominal general government gross fixed capital formation (GIN)
• nominal general government transfers to households (THN)
• nominal general government revenues from indirect taxes, total (TIN)
• nominal general government revenues from direct taxes, total (DTX)
• nominal general government revenues from employer social security contributions
(SCR)
• nominal general government revenues from employee (and other, self-employed) social
security contributions (SCE)
• nominal general government debt (GDN)
with the data abbreviations following the conventions in the Government Finance Statistics
Guide (ECB, 2007).
In the Paredes et al. (2009) database social security contributions for employers and
employees are only available after 1991Q1. Before that date only total social security
contributions are available. We compute the shares of employer and employee social security
contributions on total social security contributions from 1991Q1 to 2007Q1. These shares
are relatively stable. Therefore we impose the average 1991Q1-2007Q1 shares to total social
security contributions prior to 1991Q1 in order to obtain data on employer and employee
social security contributions.
The database provides nominal unadjusted data for all fiscal variables, plus real season-
ally adjusted data for government consumption. The methodology developed by Paredes
et al. (2009) to interpolate annual fiscal data to quarterly frequencies using cash data ex-
plicitly models a seasonal component. Hence, the quarterly fiscal database also delivers
nominal seasonally adjusted data.19
19Both series are identical to the corresponding ESA95 quarterly national accounts data, where government
consumption is the only item available in real, seasonally adjusted terms. However, Eurostat only provides
data from 1991Q1 onwards for real government consumption, and data from 1995Q1 onwards for nominal
government consumption. By construction, the government consumption data provided by Paredes et al.
(2009) therefore pins down the ESA95 data from 1991Q1 and 1995Q1 onwards. The same holds for the
remaining data in nominal unadjusted terms which are available from Eurostat from 1999Q1 onwards. The
ESA95 quarterly national accounts series which are available from 1999Q1 onwards only are total direct taxes,
total indirect taxes, total social security contributions, government investment, and transfers to households.
For the period for which no quarterly national accounts data is available, the annual sums of the fiscal data
match annual national accounts data from the European Commission’s AMECO database.
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Figure 1: The Fiscal Data, 1985Q1–2010Q2
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Notes: This figure shows the time series of the fiscal variables used in the estimation of the extended version
of the NAWM. Details on the variable transformations are provided in Section 3.1. “SSC” are social security
contributions. Shaded areas are CEPR recession dates and periods of significant growth slowdowns.
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Figure 2: A Historical Decomposition of Euro Area Real GDP Growth with the Baseline
NAWM, 2007–2010
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Notes: This figure provides a historical decomposition of euro area real GDP growth into contributions of
government consumption shocks and non-fiscal shocks using the baseline NAWM at the estimated posterior
mode. Note that in the baseline NAWM government consumption shocks are the only fiscal shocks. The
contributions of measurement errors and the initial state to this decomposition are small and not plotted. A
breakdown of all non-fiscal shocks is available upon request. Non-fiscal shocks comprise shocks to: domestic
risk premium, foreign risk premium, unit-root neutral technology, transitory neutral technology, transitory
investment-specific technology, wage markup, domestic price markup, export price markup, import price
markup, import demand, export preferences, nominal interest rate, foreign inflation, foreign output, foreign
interest rate, competitors’s export prices and oil prices.
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Figure 3: A Historical Decomposition of Euro Area Real GDP Growth with the Extended
NAWM, 2007–2010
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Notes: This figure provides a historical decomposition of euro area real GDP growth into contributions of
fiscal and non-fiscal shocks using the extended NAWM at the estimated posterior mode. Contributions of
measurement errors and the initial state to this decomposition are small and not plotted. A breakdown of
the contributions of individual fiscal shocks is provided in Figure 4. A breakdown of all non-fiscal shocks is
available upon request. Non-fiscal shocks comprise shocks to: domestic risk premium, foreign risk premium,
unit-root neutral technology, transitory neutral technology, transitory investment-specific technology, wage
markup, domestic price markup, export price markup, import price markup, import demand, export pref-
erences, nominal interest rate, foreign inflation, foreign output, foreign interest rate, competitors’s export
prices and oil prices.
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Figure 4: A Historical Decomposition of Euro Area Real GDP Growth with the Extended
NAWM, 2007–2010: The Contribution of Individual Fiscal Shocks
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Notes: This figure provides a breakdown of the contributions of fiscal shocks to euro area real GDP growth
using the extended NAWM at the estimated posterior mode.
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Figure 5: Inspecting the Economic Mechanisms: Non-Ricardian Households
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Notes: This figure shows private consumption after a lump-sum government transfer shock (one standard
deviation). The effects of various shares of non-Ricardian agents, ω, are shown. Note that, to ease under-
standing of the economic mechanism, fiscal feedback rules and pre-announcement features of the fiscal shock
are de-activated in the simulations shown in this figure. All other parameters are kept at the estimated
posterior mode.
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Figure 6: Inspecting the Economic Mechanisms: Valued Government Consumption
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Notes: This figure show private consumption after a government consumption shock (one standard deviation)
for various degrees of valuation of government consumption by households. Composite consumption that
affects household utility is given by:
C˜h,t =
(
α
1
υG
G C
υG−1
υG
h,t + (1− αG)
1
υG G
υG−1
υG
t
) υG
υG−1
.
The parameter υG determines the degree of complementarity resp. substitutability of private and government
consumption. υG → 0 is the case of perfect complements. υG → 1 is the Cobb-Douglas case while υG →∞
is the case of perfect substitutes. αG determines the share of private consumption in composite consumption.
“Non-Valued Gov. Consumption” refers to the case when αG = 1, keeping all other parameters at their
estimated posterior modes. Note that, to ease understanding of the economic mechanism, fiscal feedback
rules and pre-announcement features of the fiscal shock are de-activated in the simulations shown in this
figure. All other parameters are kept at the estimated posterior mode.
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Figure 7: Inspecting the Economic Mechanisms: Public Capital
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Notes: This figure shows private investment after a government investment shock (one standard deviation) for
various degrees of complementarity/substitutability between private and public capital. Composite capital
used in production is given by:
K˜f,t =
(
α
1
υK
K (Kf,t)
υK−1
υK + (1− αK)
1
υK (KG,t)
υK−1
υK
) υK
υK−1
.
The parameter υK determines the degree of complementarity resp. substitutability of private and public
capital. υK → 0 is the case of perfect complements. υK → 1 is the Cobb-Douglas case while υK →∞ is the
case of perfect substitutes. αK determines the share of private capital in composite capital. Note that, to
ease understanding of the economic mechanism, fiscal feedback rules and pre-announcement features of the
fiscal shock are de-activated in the simulations shown in this figure. All other parameters are kept at the
estimated posterior mode.
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Table 1: Calibration of Key Steady-State Ratios and Selected Parameters of
the Extended Version of the NAWM
Share/Parameter Description Value
A. Expenditure shares
sC Private consumption 57.5
sI Private investment 18.3
sG Government consumption 21.5
sIG Government investment 2.8
sX Exports 16.0
sIM Imports 16.0
B. Preferences
β Discount factor 0.997
ζ Inverse Frisch elasticity 2.0
αG Private consumption share in CES 0.75
C. Technology
δ Depreciation rate: private capital 0.015
δK Depreciation rate: public capital 0.015
αK Private capital share in CES 0.9
b0 Time-to-build parameter 1
D. Tax rates
τC Consumption tax 22.3
τN Labour income tax 11.6
τWh Employees’ social security contribution 12.7
τWf Employer social security contribution 13.2
τK Capital income tax 35.0
τD Profit income tax 0.0
E. Monetary policy
π¯ Inflation objective 1.90
F. Fiscal policy
BY Government debt-to-output ratio 2.40
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Table 2: Selected Estimates of the Fiscal Parameters in the Extended Version of the NAWM
Parameter Prior distribution
Posterior distribution
mode mean 5% 95%
A. Share of non-Ricardian households
ω B(0.5,0.1) 0.18 0.18 0.12 0.24
̟ B(0.5,0.2) 0.30 0.32 0.11 0.52
B. Elasticity of substitution in CES aggregates
υG N
tr(1,0.5;0) 0.29 0.37 0.00 0.61
υK N
tr(1,0.5;0) 0.84 0.98 0.17 1.69
C. Output feedback coefficients in fiscal rules
θG,Y N(0,2) 0.06 0.08 0.00 0.15
θIG,Y N(0,2) 0.55 0.52 -0.04 1.10
θTR,Y N(0,2) 0.10 0.11 -0.27 0.50
θT,Y N(0,2) 0.21 0.43 0.08 0.80
θN,Y N(0,2) 0.04 0.04 -0.03 0.11
θWh,Y N(0,2) -0.05 -0.05 -0.08 -0.02
θWf ,Y N(0,2) -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 0.00
D. Debt feedback coefficients in fiscal rules
θG,B N(0,2) -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 0.02
θIG,B N(0,2) -0.18 -0.20 -0.45 0.06
θTR,B N(0,2) -0.14 -0.13 -0.30 0.05
θT,B N(0,2) 0.07 0.15 0.04 0.27
θN,B N(0,2) 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.09
θWh,B N(0,2) -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.00
θWf ,B N(0,2) 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.02
E. Pre-announcement coefficients in fiscal rules
ψG B(0.5,0.2) 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.15
ψIG B(0.5,0.2) 0.93 0.90 0.83 0.98
ψTR B(0.5,0.2) 0.81 0.77 0.65 0.90
ψC B(0.5,0.2) 0.31 0.30 0.25 0.36
ψT B(0.5,0.2) 0.90 0.62 0.09 0.96
ψN B(0.5,0.2) 0.11 0.13 0.05 0.22
ψWh B(0.5,0.2) 0.26 0.27 0.19 0.35
ψWf B(0.5,0.2) 0.77 0.76 0.68 0.84
Note: This table provides information on the (marginal) prior and posterior distributions of selected
parameters concerning the fiscal sector of the extended version of the NAWM. The posterior distributions
are based on two Markov chains with 1000,000 draws, with 300,000 draws being discarded as burn-in
draws. The average acceptance rate is rougly 24 percent.
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Table 3: Selected Estimates of the Parameters Common to the Baseline and the Extended
Version of the NAWM
Posterior mode Posterior distribution
Parameter Description of baseline NAWM of extended NAWM
mode 5% 95%
A. Preferences
κ Habit formation 0.59 0.57 0.53 0.66
B. Wage and price setting
ξW Calvo: wages 0.78 0.85 0.81 0.90
χW Indexation: wages 0.54 0.53 0.36 0.69
ξH Calvo: domestic prices 0.93 0.92 0.88 0.93
χH Indexation: domestic prices 0.38 0.82 0.63 0.89
ξX Calvo: export prices 0.80 0.55 0.34 0.64
χX Indexation: export prices 0.50 0.81 0.62 0.92
ξ∗ Calvo: import prices 0.50 0.07 0.05 0.10
χ∗ Indexation: import prices 0.35 0.44 0.27 0.64
C. Final-good production
µC Subst. elast.: consumption 2.28 1.98 1.66 2.55
µI Subst. elast.: investment 1.69 1.75 1.39 2.31
D. Adjustment costs
γI Investment 5.56 6.10 5.05 7.20
γIM,C Import content: consumption 5.62 4.16 2.20 5.71
γIM,I Import content: investment 0.83 0.80 0.35 5.17
γ∗ Export market share 2.68 2.69 1.69 5.07
E. Interest-rate rule
φR Interest-rate smoothing 0.88 0.86 0.81 0.90
φΠ Resp. to inflation 1.89 1.73 1.54 1.84
φ∆Π Resp. to change in inflation 0.14 0.20 0.13 0.30
φ∆Y Resp. to output growth 0.16 0.11 0.07 0.17
Note: This table provides information on the (marginal) posterior distributions of selected parameters com-
mon to the baseline and the extended version of the NAWM. The posterior distributions for the extended
NAWM are based on two Markov chains, each with 1000,000 draws, with 300,000 draws being discarded as
burn-in draws. The average acceptance rate is rougly 24 percent. Note that the baseline NAWM has been
re-estimated using data until 2010.
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Table 4: Composition of the European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP)
Stimulus measures 2009 2010 Fiscal instruments
Measures aimed at households 0.4 0.3 τC , τN , τWh , TR
Measures aimed at businesses 0.2 0.2 τWf
Increased public investment 0.3 0.2 IG
Increased spending on labour market 0.1 0.1 G
Total 1.1 0.8
Note: Stimulus measures are expressed as a percentage of GDP. The measures aimed at households are
evenly distributed across the model’s fiscal instruments.
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Table 5: Standardised Fiscal Multipliers and EERP Impact
Quarters
Long run Maximum
1 4 8 16
A. Fiscal instrument
Gov. consumption, G 1.26 1.55 1.62 1.67 1.63 1.69
Gov. investment, IG 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.13 1.55 1.55
Gov. transfers, TR 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07
Consumption taxes, τC 0.36 0.46 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.50
Labour income taxes, τN 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.15
SSC: employees, τWh 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.04 0.15 0.15
SSC: employers, τWf -0.04 -0.04 -0.00 0.05 0.04 0.05
B. Fiscal package
EERP: fiscal multipliers 0.64 0.68 0.72 0.76 0.89 0.89
EERP: output effects 0.68 0.72 0.62 0.03 0.00 0.72
Note: Present-value fiscal multipliers of a 2-year stimulus of 1% of GDP accompanied by 2 years of
monetary accommodation. The fiscal multipliers and the European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP)
effects are computed at the posterior mode estimates of the model parameters. In the simulations, the
intra-annual profile of the EERP stimulus measures in 2009 and 2010 is assumed to be flat. The output
effects of the EERP are average percentage deviations from the steady state after a 2-year standardised
fiscal stimulus (1.1 percent in the first year, and 0.8 percent in the second year in terms of baseline GDP)
accompanied by 2 years of monetary accommodation.
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